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What now follows is not an exact transcript. It is the written version of what I meant to say above, though as I was not reading from a script, I sometimes veered away from the plan when speaking:
Scott and Watson's Floor-Leverage Rule
Jason Scott and John Watson are both important developers of work from William Sharpe’s Financial Engines which explains why the 4% rule, that is, spending a constant stream of income from a portfolio of volatile assets, is an incredibly inefficient retirement income strategy. In their new article called “The Floor-Leverage Rule for Retirement,” from the September/October 2013 Financial Analysts Journal, they make an effort to develop a retirement income strategy which can better meet the competing retiree preferences that have turned the 4% rule into the default strategy for retirement.
Retiree preferences which increase the seemingly attractiveness of using the 4% rule include:
- A desire for sustainable and non-decreasing spending over retirement
- An appetite for taking equity risk in the hope of supporting a higher sustainable spending stream
- A strategy which will be relatively simple to implement and to understand
The fundamental problem is the trade-off between wanting downside protection to ensure a sustainable spending stream and also wanting portfolio growth and greater upside. Stock and Watson argue that their floor-leverage rule provides a more effective way to satisfy these preferences than using a traditional portfolio with something like a 50/50 allocation to stocks and bonds.
So what is the floor-leverage rule? Essentially, it is a barbell strategy. With traditional rebalancing, one buys stocks after they lose value which can lead to portfolio depletion in worst-case scenarios. With the floor leverage rule, one doesn’t buy stocks after they fall in value, but rather only sell stocks after they gain in value. This is accomplished by building a safe and secure spending floor with 85% of the assets in the financial portfolio. This provides a lifetime floor which spending can never fall below. Next, they put the remaining 15% of financial assets in a highly-volatile 3x-leveraged equity portfolio. Finally, they conduct annual portfolio reviews. If the equity portion of the portfolio exceeds 15% of the portfolio asset allocation, then sell enough equities to return to the 15% allocation and use the proceeds to ratchet up the spending level supported by the secure spending portfolio. Otherwise, do nothing.
With this approach, spending can increase, but it can never decrease. It is possible for the leveraged equity allocation to be wiped out, but the initial secure spending floor is still in place and the retiree is exposed to, at most, a 15% drop in their financial assets.
Let’s consider the spending floor created by the 85% allocation. Depending on client preferences, spending could be supported in constant or in inflation-adjusted terms, or some combination of the two. The level of spending depends on the longevity risk aversion of the client. The more fearful they are of outliving their assets, the longer their bond ladder would need to be. This will mean less spending. With greater longevity risk aversion, including an income annuity will support greater spending since the mortality-risk pooling offered by the insurer allows payouts to be based on terms closer to one’s life expectancy. The use of longevity insurance, also called a deferred income annuity, also provides a way to increase sustainable spending by allowing for a shorter planning horizon with the bond ladder, with the longevity tail covered by the annuity.
Scott and Watson’s arguments in favor of this approach are very compelling. A caveat, of course, is that in today’s low interest rate environment, the amount of safe and sustainable spending that many retirees could build with 85% of their assets could be low. That’s the bad news. The good news is that even though initial retirement spending is low, the spending level is secure and there is a good chance that it could increase later in retirement.
It seems to me that there are really two separate issues on the table with Scott and Watson's work.
ReplyDeleteThe first is simply to apply a floor-with-upside strategy. I've always contended that the 4% rule IS a floor-with-upside strategy (see http://www.kitces.com/blog/annuities-versus-safe-withdrawal-rates-comparing-floorupside-approaches/ ) as when you look at how practitioners practice, that is undoubtedly the case. No financial planner in history has ever said to a client "Yeah, you have $7.2M dollars, but since you started out with a 4% rule, your inflation-adjusted withdrawals are up to $62,858 and you can't spend a dime more than that, your kids will just have to become multimillionaires after you die." Granted, the research in this area has been poor in articulating WHEN it's safe to ratchet up or reset an SWR floor (Bengen's work with Klinger, and Klinger's subsequent work alone, tackled this to some extent, but that's about it). But the fact that it's under-researched doesn't "prove" it's inefficient. Scott and Watson (and Sharpe in his writings on this as well) have claimed the SWR 4% rule is inefficient based on an academically narrow reading of the research that has NEVER represented how it's applied in practice. So to say their strategy is "more efficient" than SWR because theirs ratchets and SWR doesn't is to ignore the actual application of SWR in practice. BOTH are floor-with-upside ratchet strategies; the SWR ratchet framework is just underdeveloped.
The secondary part of their article, then, is a discussion of how best to set the "floor" of a floor-with-upside approach. SWR uses a diversified portfolio. Scott and Watson use a TIPS base with a smaller leveraged upside - sort of a strange form of a portable alpha strategy? That certainly deserves a look - and I've long theoretized that a larger base with a small volatile component might be more effective - though I'd have concern about the true sustainability of 3X leveraged funds in the long run, given the anti-compounding effects of 3X daily leverage on a sustained basis (lots of articles written about how serious bad this is when 3X funds are held for a long time). But it's certainly an interesting theoretical framework.
Again, though, it's really crucial to distinguish between "having a ratchet strategy" (which is not actually unique for Scott & Watson, even though they imply it is), and "how to set the floor and upside components of a floor-with-upside strategy" where they set forth at least an 'interesting' approach...
- Michael
Michael,
DeleteThank you for the insights. Certainly you are making a good point that the pure-4% rule spending pattern is not actually used by anyone in practice and so it becomes a bit of a straw man. It would be interesting to compare the floor-leverage rule to the Guyton decision rules, which do build in a methodology for ratcheting up AND down. What are the odds that spending under a Guyton approach could fall under the level sustained with the 85% secure floor? This is something which could be investigated.
Wade,
DeleteOne of Klinger's follow-up articles (around 2008-2009 I think?) looked at a more generic framework of Guyton's rules, where you could set the thresholds for the preservation and prosperity rules, including (I think?) setting the threshold so there were no preservation cuts, only prosperity raises.
The latter would basically be the best point of comparison, as that would essentially be a pure 4%-rule-with-ratchet approach.
- Michael
I agree. And having that hard floor does leave the potential for financial asset depletion.
DeleteThere appears to be a significant flaw in the execution of the authors' strategy. Leveraged ETFs are short-term trading vehicles, not instruments that are appropriate for long-term investment. While a 3x leveraged ETF may deliver a daily return that is 3 times that of the benchmark index, simply compounding amplified daily returns will not produce a long run return that is 3 times that of the index.
ReplyDeleteThank you. I've been hearing feedback to that effect. Leveraged ETFs is an area I've never really even considered trying to invest in, so I'm not too familiar with them. But I see what you mean. The increased volatility will push down the compounded return relative to just a simple 3x calculation. The authors might have a response for this, as it seems like something they would have considered with the brainpower involved behind the study.
DeleteThanks for the information. Everyone's dream is to have the best and very secure future. When it comes to retirement, we want to stay at a holistic and cheerful retirement communities long island where we can have everything that we want. I would want to find such communities.
ReplyDeleteIf SWR "ratchets up" in practice when a portfolio is up (Michael's example), doesn't it then need to "ratchet down" when the portfolio is down? And isn't that significantly different than only ratcheting in an upward direction and having a secure floor?
ReplyDeleteDon't floor strategies ratchet up the secure floor, while SWR strategies ratchet up an annual withdrawal amount that might not be sustainable?
Hi! Wade,
ReplyDeleteContinued thanks to you for furthering the understanding of retirement issues. I have been reviewing again the work in this area (floor/upside) and was reminded of this vblog and thread.
I would take issue with what has become the standard (but unexamined?) refutation of leveraged ('geared') ETFs.
The Journal of Banking and Finance published an article by Loviscek, Tang and Xu in the June '14 issue (Vol 43, pp 29-47) entitled "Do Leveraged Exchange-Traded Products Deliver Their Stated Multiples?" Contrary to seemingly widespread misperception, the authors find that the deviation of returns from naive expectations do not (overall) adversely affect investor returns over holding periods of a year or longer. I have some minor questions about the methodology here, but my own observations of ex-post returns to leveraged funds tend to support the finding.
Granted, a "daily 3X" leveraged product will be unlikely to deliver 3X returns over long holding periods. But if the long-term ex-post return is 2.5X, what exactly is the issue with that? So long as the investor understands these issues in advance, I have found nothing to suggest any inadvisability re: using these leveraged products for 'geared' purposes as suggested by Scott/Watson or Ayres/Nalebuff (Diversification Across Time.
Curious to hear your (and others') views.
Gratefully,
Stephen Barnes
Stephen, thanks for the additional contributions. These leveraged funds have not really been on my radar, so I'm not too deeply involved in this particular debate, but I do welcome the further discussion.
ReplyDelete